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Between resistance and co-operation
Contact zones in the Aru Islands
in the VOC period
Hans Hägerdal
Abstract

The article is focused on early colonial interaction with the Aru Islands,
geographically located in southern Maluku, at the easternmost end of the Indian
Ocean world. The study examines how relationships were constructed in the
course of the seventeenth century, how they were institutionalized and how this
engendered forms of hybridity. Moreover, it discusses forms of resistance and
avoidance in relation to the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Aru constitutes
an interesting case as it is was one of the easternmost places in the world in
which Islam and Christianity gained a (limited) foothold in the early-modern
period, and it also marked the outer limit of Dutch authority. Aru differed
from most geographical areas approached by the VOC because of its lack of
any large-scale political structures and its relatively non-hierarchical society.
The article discusses the forging of Dutch-Arunese political ties after the Banda
massacre in 1621, as well as the role of Asian competitors of the VOC such as
the Makassarese and Ceramese, the increasing adaptation to world religions in
an Arunese setting, conditions in the European-indigenous contact zones and,
finally, the conflicts arising from the imbalances between western and eastern
Aru, in which the VOC repeatedly intervened to suppress the villages of the
Backshore (east coast).
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The mirrored past
About five centuries ago, the first building-blocks were laid in a colonial system
that would reshape much of what we call the Malay Archipelago. The arrival
in Maluku, the fabled Spice Islands, of ships from distant Portugal in 1512
speedily altered the political balance in the region fundamentally. The basic
idea was simple enough: force the local populations to deliver valuable goods
on carefully stipulated terms. This pattern was reinforced by the construction
of fortresses, the manipulation of local rulers and attempts at Christianization.
Although the Portuguese were soon to be rivalled by Spanish, English, and
Dutch seafarers, these ingredients would mark Western-Malukan relations
for centuries to come (Andaya 1993). The enormous potential profits to be
made from nutmeg, mace and cloves ensured that geographical names such
as Ternate, Tidore, Ambon, and Banda earned a common currency, even in
Europe. Titles such as Conquista de las islas Molucas and A true declaration of
the conspiracy in Amboyna testify to European curiosity about the spices and
how they were procured.
Among the islands explored by the Portuguese was the Aru group far to
the southeast in the Arafura Sea. What they knew, or cared to write down,
about it was rudimentary. Its bonding with the important centre of nutmeg
production, the Banda Islands, was noted, as were the natural curiosities to
be obtained from there. Birds of paradise and loris (parrots) were attractive
luxury articles, either dead or alive (Pires 1944: 209). Nevertheless compared
to Ternate, Tidore, Ambon, and Banda, the islands in Southern Maluku were
relegated to a second rank. Many of the luxury products that would later
make Aru worth fighting and killing for were still under the European radar:
pearls, trepang, birds’ nests, turtle-shell. It is ethnographic studies from the
nineteenth and twentieth century that have provided a detailed picture of the
social structure and economic bases of the tightly clustered, low-lying islands.1
While such accounts from the late colonial and post-colonial eras might give
a false impression of immutability, obviously there were strong historical
continuities. Whatever accounts of Aru that we have from the early-modern
period suggest that certain features have continued to be recognizable over
the centuries: a racially mixed and fairly non-hierarchical society, illiterate and
relatively low-technological, fragmented into a large number of autonomous
settlements but adapted to the common Malukan ritual division in an Ulisiwa
and an Ulilima bond (Riedel 1886: 248-270). It was this insular world that the
Dutch East India Company (VOC) broached in 1623, eighteen years after its
first establishment in Maluku and two years after the infamous genocide on
Banda. This event inaugurated 326 years of sometimes uneasy Dutch-Arunese
relations (Spyer 2000: 19).
How these relations were built up and institutionalized, and how the
relationship engendered hybridity, is the theme of this article. Although this
1
For an overview of the history and culture of Southern Maluku, see De Jonge and Van Dijk
1995. The now classical treatment of Aru civilization is Spyer 2000. Early notable ethnographic
and naturalist accounts can be found in Wallace (1869), Riedel (1886), and Merton (1910).
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study is limited to the seventeenth century, the long period of engagement and
the relatively verbose sources make Aru a telling case for the workings of early
colonialism. It is particularly interesting since it was the easternmost post of the
VOC. The situation in Aru also ties in with two issues in recent historiography.
Firstly, the question to what extent the European trade networks were
restructuring Asian markets previously operated by peddlers, or were instead
built on existing sophisticated trading structures (Andrade 2018: 245-248). And
secondly, whether European foreigners could win acceptance in small-scale
Asian societies as “stranger kings”, holding a fragmented system in place
through a number of institutionalized relationships (Henley 2002). The role of
hybridity has been discussed intensively in post-colonial research, notably by
Homi Bhabha (1994). In Bhabha’s version, it implies that hegemonic discourses
in a milieu imprinted by colonial dominance are in fact fractured and unstable.
Although highly contested, the concept could be useful in understanding
the pattern of the formation of the colonial subject. Hence, the subordinated
and partly Christianized groups of Aru were defined through a process of
iteration and translation that made them either commendable or abjectly
barbarian depending on the situation, especially contingent on their adaptation
to European norms. But there is also an active side to this hybridity, as local
strategies played a role in co-opting the white strangers. This applies not least
to the economic opportunities on the islands, opportunities that were not
merely appropriated by the VOC but also developed locally under its aegis.
A note on the sources is appropriate here. As are its counterparts in most
of Eastern Indonesia, Aru society was generally illiterate until the twentieth
century. The European sources occasionally mention letters from seafarers
and chiefs that were probably written in Malay using Jawi script. However,
the only Malay letters that have survived from the period in question are a
few specimens from the Christian centre in Wokam written by non-Arunese
teachers. Apart from these, what we have are the reports and dagregisters (daily
logs) from VOC employees, the majority originating from the post in Banda.
Although sometimes very detailed, these employees naturally wrote what
was expected of them. Consequently the Arunese past is mirrored through
colonial aspirations and perceptions. Bearing these reservations in mind,
it might still be possible to trace the discursive existence of local people by
observing their responses to the Dutch impact. This might entail a strategic
mimicry of the colonial culture, but also evoke situations that contradict the
Dutch image of order and caused colonial anxiety.

First contact
The name Aru occurs from time to time on maps and in travel descriptions
from the sixteenth century, unfortunately without much detail (see Map 1). A
map from about 1540 mentions the island group using the present standard
spelling Aru (Pires 1944: 209). Another map from 1537 indicates an island
approximately in this location called Ilha de Gomes de Sequeira, apparently
after a Portuguese visitor. Later, a number of maps from ca 1560 and 1571
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show Aru with the comment: ”aqui invernou Martim Afonso de Melo” – Martim
Afonso de Melo overwintered here (Thomaz 2001, plates IX, XIV, XV, XVII).

Map 1. The Aru Islands. Army Map Service, U.S. Army, 1942; source: public domain
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aru_Islands_Regency#/media/File:Aru_txu-oclc6558822-sb53-2+5.jpg).
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In other words, the Portuguese sailors had a nodding acquaintance with
Aru, meaning that their Dutch successors did not encounter any terra incognita
from a European point of view. In fact, in her well-known study of Aru society,
Patricia Spyer has recorded legends that refer to the early Portuguese visitors
(Spyer 2000: 81-87). Unrecorded activities by Portuguese people in this part
of the Archipelago might also be hinted at in a story that a Dutch expedition
picked up in 1602, namely: that “white” people were living on the southern
side of New Guinea, opposite Aru (Heeres 1899: 3).
For details about the islands, from the early seventeenth century onward
we must turn to Dutch sources. The well-known VOC expedition led by
Willem Jansz in 1605-1606 touched the Kei and Aru Islands on its way to
Papua and Queensland, but little is known in detail about the voyage or
any contacts with the local populations (Heeres 1899: 5-6). At this time, the
Company was fighting a war against its Portuguese rivals (in its extended
sense, the Spanish empire) who were expelled from Ambon, giving the Dutch
their first permanent position in Southeast Asia. From this base they began
interfering in the affairs of the nutmeg- and mace-producing Banda Islands,
that were governed by local orangkayas (chiefs, lit. rich men), but found they
had to contend with redoubtable rivals in the English East India Company
(EIC). As the tension between the VOC and EIC built up, in 1616 the Dutch
launched a violent intervention on one of the Banda Islands, and began to
think of subordinating Kei and Aru by either peaceful or coercive means.
The reason for their interest in the distant and poorly known islands was
logistical: Kei and Aru were allied to the pro-English Bandanese, who used to
take on provisions there. Importantly the Bandanese ships were constructed
on these forested islands. The anxious Dutch believed that a Bandanese fleet
with six months’ worth of provisions was skulking just beyond the horizon,
and once it appeared the locals would fall on the whites, ”[…] since we think
that this devilish band has a nature like that of tigers (as they write of them)
who never forget their cruelty, but sometimes hide it in order to be the more
cruel when one is least attentive […]” (Tiele 1886: 154). The distrust was not
a complete figment of their imagination, since a Dutch commander had been
ambushed there in 1609, opening the door for future conflicts. As it happened,
the massacre never eventuated, but Banda remained a contested area for the
next five years. These brief remarks suggest that at this time the relatively small
but commercially active Banda Islands had developed a working relationship
with Kei and Aru, the latter providing timber and foodstuffs that were not
available in sufficient quantities on Banda itself. As a consequence of this
alliance, the ecological balance of Banda was to some extent sustained, and the
Arunese probably accrued advantages in the form of external trading goods.
Direct contact with the Arunese followed in 1619, but was far from
peaceful. The Company-allied raja of Kilang on Ambon saw his negeri
(settlement) visited by one junk and two large sampans from Aru. Judging
from other sources, the majority of their crews seem to have come from Ujir,
a small but prominent island on the western side of Aru. These vessels were
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loaded with sago and on their way to Banda, but had been blown off course.
When the suspicious Dutch in the fort in Ambon heard about the unwanted
guests, they sent a korakora (outrigger) with nine soldiers to demand that they
pay their respects to the Company. However, the Arunese were 150 strong and
not in a mood to acquiesce. They tied their three ships to each other and resisted
the Dutch and their allies, ”being a very obstinate nation”. The seamen shot
at their adversaries with bows and arrows that they handled with expertise
After a fierce contest, the Arunese were eventually killed or captured. The
Dutch secured the sago cargo of the junk that formed a welcome addition to
their supplies since all the rice at the VOC fort had been used up in the last
three months. Those Arunese who remained alive were clapped in irons and
imprisoned in the fort, from which a few managed to escape. Of the others,
so many died the Dutch commander found that his best option was to sell the
survivors as slaves, since the Arunese were considered to be the subjects of the
hostile Bandanese (Tiele 1886: 264). The selling of prisoners-of-war as slaves
was a common practice in Southeast Asian societies, a custom unhesitatingly
emulated by the Company (Reid 1983: 157-158). The remark that Aru was
subject to Banda is intriguing because there was no state as such on Banda,
just a hierarchy of orangkayas; a situation that suggests a strong alliance rather
than Bandanese “rule”. It is known from later history that alliances known as
pela were formed between villages in Aru and other parts of Maluku. These
alliances could be quite efficacious and were cemented by marriage relations.

Contracts and their limitation
The fate of Aru was contingent on that of Banda. The forces of the VOC
defeated the small EIC garrison on Banda in 1620-1621 and proceeded to
exterminate or enslave the islanders (Milton 1999: 271-308, 312-318). Some
Bandanese were able to escape to other parts of Maluku, a fact that would
later have consequences for Aru. Banda was transformed into a complex of
nutmeg plantations (perken) that were worked by slaves from various parts of
maritime Asia – a rare counterpart to the plantation system of the West Indies
in the same era (Hanna 1978; Winn 2010). Despite all its violent actions, from its
inception the VOC took care to conclude contracts with Asian rulers and chiefs,
thereby securing a political network conducive to the comprehensive trading
system that it was attempting to construct. Although the contracts concluded
with the minor polities in the Malay Archipelago transformed the latter into
allies, the arrangement usually had a more covert coercive side and was not
intended to be a treaty between equals (Van Ittersum 2018: 155). In their most
basic form, these contracts entailed a promise of Company protection, an
obligation to keep other “white” and “black” nations away from the coasts
and restrictions on trade. Given the fragmentation in Maluku, the Dutch were
forced to seek out the main negeris on the many islands and conclude contracts
with the principal orangkayas. Therefore we have separate contracts from the
seventeenth century for Wetar, Kisar, Babar, Marsela, Damar, Leti, Kei, and
so on. In general terms, we can discern an increasing Dutch power over the
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sprawling island world of Maluku in the decades after the 1660s, when the
spice sultanates Ternate and Tidore were being increasingly subordinated,
peace was restored with Portugal and the Spanish retreated from North
Maluku (Andaya 1993: 170-173).
Less than two years after the bloody events on Banda, the VOC authorities
dispatched a new exploratory expedition under the command of Jan
Carstensz, who reached Queensland and Arnhem Land in 1623. One of its
stated aims was to bond with the island groups to the south of Banda, Kei,
Aru, and Tanimbar. Carstensz visited Aru on his way to and from Australia
and left a detailed account of his experiences with the islanders. The text is
of considerable ethnographic interest since it is the first to give an idea of the
local culture, especially in Ujir that was the first place to be visited. As he
writes, the land had no kings but only orangkayas whose hands would be tied
unless they deliberated with the local population (Van Dijk 1859: 9-10). The
inhabitants seemed suspicious at first, but the local orangkayas soon engaged
in deliberations with Carstensz and his officers. The Dutch offered the Ujirese
permission to bring their trading goods to Ambon and Banda. Furthermore,
they promised that the surviving prisoners from the 1619 incident would be
returned, a pledge that particularly gladdened the latters’ hearts. For their
part, the Ujirese had to promise not to collude with the Bandanese refugees
or the Seramese who were intrepid long-distance traders and seafarers. To
seal the matter, the chiefs swore an oath or mattacauw by pouring water over
their heads and calling on the sun to be their witness. On the return voyage
from Australia, Carstensz arranged a formal contract with the orangkayas of
Ujir and a number of other settlements on the western side of Aru: Tutafaning,
Salguadingh, Wokam, Wamar, Fangabel, Maekor, Ratu, and Trangan. Apart
from the mysterious Salguadingh, the names are still found on modern
maps. The contract reiterated the stipulations agreed with the Ujirese chiefs,
and, for want of a stone slab, an inscribed wooden pillar was erected in Ujir
(Heeres 1907: 179-182). A similar contract was also concluded with chiefs in
the Kei Islands, who had likewise been dependent on the Bandanese up to
1621. Kei and Aru are often mentioned in tandem in the seventeenth-century
documents, although the societies differ in many respects. In the eyes of the
Company, the contract was decisive, as it included Aru in a perceived colonial
order and could be wielded in diplomatic arguments with rivals. Although
it was basically a commercial enterprise, the VOC quickly assumed colonial
traits, and the first paragraph in the contract explicitly states that the Arunese
acknowledged the Company as their sovereign lord. The second paragraph
says that their land, fortifications, places, and the fruits of the land will be
handed over to the Company by them and their descendants (Heeres 1907:
179-182). Nevertheless the contract remains silent about the settlements of
the so-called Backshore (Agterwal) in the east, that delivered many natural
products to the west via the system of natural canals (sungai) that still divide
the main islands from each other. The Backshore peoples have a stronger
Papuan heritage, are difficult to reach in larger ships and have been slower
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to adapt traits of foreign culture than the west. This begs the question of the
implications of the contract for the local populations. As a basically non-literate
people, the wording of the five paragraphs of the contract was presumably
less important to the Arunese than the performance of the ritual mattakauw.
Many locals might have seen the Dutch as the successors to the Bandanese,
that is, as the principal counterparts in economic redistribution. However,
any such view would soon be dispersed by the relatively patchy contacts with
the Dutch in the following decades. Moreover, the event did little or nothing
to bridge the contradiction between the ritual bonds of Ursia and Urlima,
although settlements from both “signed” the contract.
In fact, there is no question that the Dutch had to renew diplomatic contacts
again and again. An exploratory expedition to parts of Maluku, under the
command of Adriaan Dortsman, was carried out in 1646. Accompanying
Dortsman was the preacher J. Vertrecht who made a separate trip to Kei and
Aru and left a very detailed diary that is an important source for contemporary
conditions. Unlike many Company employees, Vertrecht took the locals
seriously and tried to grasp their mindsets. As he found out, there was little
unity even within the negeris, that consisted of several sub-units designated
by the Maluku-wide word soa. Hence the principal orangkaya in Ujir declared
to the Dutch that he had very little say in the other section of the negeri.
Likewise, two orangkayas in Wokam received Vertrecht in a friendly manner,
while two others, who headed a different soa, kept away. The two amicable
headmen admitted their lack of executive power when Vertrecht offered to
take up residence among them, learn their tongue and instruct their children
in a Christian school. The chiefs responded that this would only be possible
if one of the “blacks” was the chief over the others; however, at present they
were a disunited flock in which the one liked to participate in this and the other
in that. Vertrecht comments that he was surprised that they had such shrewd
political insights. It was obvious that politics had a life of their own in Aru,
where the western negeris were on bad terms with each other and enticed the
Backshore peoples into their game; Ujir feared attacks from the Krei people
but allied with those of Batuley who raided the villagers of Wokam.2
Vertrecht’s attempts to establish a Christian mission in the islands were
rapidly thwarted by the deep suspicion elicited by the Dutch presence. As the
preacher relates in detail in his account, a Javanese vessel suddenly arrived
in western Aru, piloted by two Bandanese refugees who wasted no time
telling the islanders about real or imagined European misdeeds. According
to Vertrecht, they had recently played the same game in the Kei Islands, so
graphically the inhabitants had fled at the sight of the Dutch ships, “so that
the slave trade was greatly impeded, nay, was mostly frustrated”. Vertrecht
went ashore on Ujir with only the interpreter as company. Arriving in the
negeri, he saw a large circle of people armed with swords, arrows and bows,
engaged in a bicara (deliberation). He asked the old, previously amicable
2
VOC 1159, Diary, J. Vertrecht, sub 2-3-1646. This and all following references to VOC
archival numbers are to VOC Archief, 1.04.02, Nationaal Archief, The Hague.
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orangkaya Wocan Amma why he had asked the Dutch to leave so abruptly.
The orangkaya referred to the rumour emanating from the Javanese and
Malays from Kei, namely: that Dutch people in Elat planned to build a fort.
They feared such prospect, saying that Kei was as a kakak (senior brother) and
Aru as an adik (junior brother). If Kei was conquered, it meant that Aru could
offer little resistance. The preacher tried to refute the accusations, but to little
avail. After meeting up with the fleet of Adriaan Dortsman some days later,
the Dutch left Aru for the time being.3
While we have only the European version, we can trace the discursive
existence of the Arunese in the troubled communication between the
missionary and the chiefs. Certain details in the account seem to have been
misunderstood by Vertrecht, for instance, the idea that Kei and Aru, in their
entirety, were symbolically kakak and adik.4 Whatever the real situation was,
the violent actions in and coercive regulations imposed on the region created
a deep sense of distrust and suspicion, maybe strengthened by the Dutch
demand that the locals deliver slaves. However, this suspicion was offset by
a policy pursued by some groups of actively inviting the Dutch. In particular,
the important negeri Wokam, on the island of the same name, was keen to
welcome Christian teachers. Some Arunese addressed the Banda authorities
in 1645 and again in 1657, as revealed in a missive from that year:
Those of Aru, an island situated about 65 miles to the east of Banda, that is heathen,
have, because of a special intuition for the Holy Ghost, [...] grown much inclined to
be delivered from their heathen blindness into the true Christian light. Therefore
they asked the governor [of Banda] most persistently for teachers. His Honour
has deliberated on this matter with the church council. His Honour had found
it good to send a krankbezoeker there on the yacht the Coutchin and the sloop the
Batavia in February, [a man] who is knowledgeable in the Malay language, which
tongue is known among these people. He returned from there to Banda on 10
May, and related that he found the people very disposed to Christian education,
and that several orangkayas had learnt, among other things, the most common
daily prayers by heart and with satisfactory zeal, with the wish that they should
be further educated as time passes. (Coolhaas 1968: 152).5

Shortly afterwards, in 1658, a new contract was concluded with several
orangkayas, followed in 1659 by the establishment of a permanent missionary
post in Wokam, whose population was deemed to be well disposed and
susceptible to the creed.6 After a spate of local warfare in 1661-1663, it was
developed into a fortified site with a small token garrison. This was in line
with contemporary developments in Maluku. In 1645 and 1652, the VOC
issued resolutions ordering forts to be built on various islands to protect trade
VOC 1159, Diary, J. Vertrecht, sub 21-3-1646.
In these terms, the idea seems to be unknown in modern Aru and only applicable to certain
settlements.
5
This and subsequent translations from VOC sources are by the author.
6
VOC 1229, Report, Banda, 1659, f. 541. The 1658 contract is quoted in ANRI Banda 45:1,
Arsip Nasional, Jakarta, Letter, Banda to Batavia, 1796.
3
4
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interests (Bleeker 1858: 263). At this point it should be should be recalled that
the position of the Company in the 1650s was strengthened by the suppression
of resistance in Ambon and the fostering of closer ties with the North Malukan
spice sultanates (Knaap 2004: 29-34; Andaya 1993: 164-175). The same decade
saw a strong Dutch expansion in such diverse parts of the Indian Ocean world
as South Africa, Sri Lanka and West Timor, spurred on by mercantile ambitions
to regulate trade routes and production centres. But there is also an Arunese
side to the establishment. Without denying that interest in the new religion
might have been serious, the repeated invitations by west coast villagers were
most probably strategically motivated. The Dutch were foreign and in some
respects frightening, but they might also have offered the best possibilities
for stability among the fragmented communities. A missive from Batavia to
the VOC board in Amsterdam in 1681, retrospectively gives an idea about
what was at stake.
Aru has since ancient times been divided into two mutually fighting peoples
from the general eastern factions of Ulisiwa and Ulilima, one living in the east
and the other on the west side; which last-mentioned, finding itself too weak
against the first-mentioned, sought the protection of and submission to the Noble
Company in the years 1646, 1653, and 1659, whereby those of Wokam accepted
Christianity. (Coolhaas 1971: 432).

The Siwa-Lima division, found in many places of Maluku, was therefore also
present on Aru, where the two bonds were called Urlima and Ursia, names that
were popularly explained as ”shark” and ”whale”. According to a tradition
mentioned by a later visitor Brumund (1845: 289), the division is derived
from the rivalry between the sultanates Ternate and Tidore, whose rulers
had privy councils consisting of five and nine members, respectively. This
is questioned by Van Fraassen (1987: 510-511), who believes that the idea of
the division was disseminated from one or two centres in the Maluku region,
over which Banda could have exercised a considerable influence. Hence it was
also applied to the socio-political situation in various Malukan sub-regions.
Leaving this aside, it is clear that the local settlements were deeply involved
in power structures, of which the Dutch might have been dimly aware, whose
fluctuations required persistent invitations. A large number of cases from
maritime Southeast Asia have shown that Europeans could be accepted as
“stranger kings” by fragmented or vulnerable societies (Henley 2002). We
shall come back to this syndrome.

Alternative outsiders
As so few alternative textual records have been preserved for southern
Maluku, the bulky nature of the VOC records is deceptive in any attempt to
form a framework of understanding. Unlike contemporary Dai Viet, Ayudhya,
Java, and Bali, there are no indigenous textual narratives, leaving the Company
by default the main referent for economic and political order in the region.
With this is mind, it would nevertheless be misleading to see the colonial
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archive as an expression of an order of power. As Ann Laura Stoler (2009)
and others have pointed out, the archive expresses colonial uncertainties and
failures as well as successes, and it is through these we can trace alternative
sources of authority. In fact, a closer look at the VOC reports and dagregisters
indicates an array of Asian groups that, far from being mere smugglers and
troublemakers (as frustrated Company servants would have it), explored sea
routes and established commercial routines that were beyond the competence
of the Company to eradicate.
The presence of Bandanese refugees, noted by Vertrecht, was in fact a
principal theme that the Dutch tried to map as they expanded their authority
in Maluku. Interviews with orangkayas on small, inaccessible islands such
as Marsela (beyond Babar) would routinely include the question if any
“Old Bandanese” had been spotted.7 It has even been suggested that the
Bandanese diaspora stimulated trade in the region, naturally beyond the back
of the Company. These fears proved warranted in the case of Kei, where the
villagers of Eli and Elat speak Bandanese to this day (Kaartinen 2010: 19-53).
The German Company employee Saar published a travel account in which
he alleged that Vertrecht’s little expedition to Aru in 1646 was attacked by
Bandanese archers wielding poisonous arrows, their women shooting at
the hapless Europeans from the tree tops (Saar 1930: 51-55). As Vertrecht’s
diary shows the story is completely untrue, but points to an awareness of the
Bandanese as dangerous and prone to seize every opportunity to avenge the
1621 massacre.
Another group of alternative outsiders was the band of enterprising
seafarers from East Seram and Seram Laut who had maintained an extensive
trade system since at least the sixteenth century. This has been analysed
in detail by Roy Ellen (2003: 54-118). Certain villages on Gorom Island in
particular entertained relations with counterparts in Aru. In 1660, shortly after
their establishment in Wokam, the Dutch received unwelcome company as
a few respected orangkayas from Gorom moved over and settled on Aru, and
“played the master among these gullible people”. The reason was economic;
Gorom was “breadless”, meaning that this commercially oriented island did
not produce sufficient foodstuffs, and hence recruited Aru into its economic
network as a component so as to fill the deficiency. This is actually similar to
the use made of Arunese resources by pre-Dutch Banda. The Dutch, wary of
the unreliable Goromese, took steps to expel them (Coolhaas 1968: 315-316; Van
der Chijs 1889: 19-20). The relations nevertheless persisted over the following
centuries in the form of pela alliances. As Tom Goodman found during
fieldwork in the region, the important Goromese negeri Amar maintained
alliances in the Watubela, Kei and Aru Archipelagos, and there is even a myth
about a powerful Muslim imam who “civilized” Kei and Aru. Imam Tatakora
taught the islanders to deliver babies properly, and the grateful Keiese and
Arunese villages pledged a pela in return. Moreover, a peculiar division of
labour evolved, in which a group of Goromese families manufactured knives
7

VOC 1281, Interview with the orangkayas of Marsela, 1671, f. 634.
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on an atoll in Kei, selling them to Gorom, Kei and Aru (Goodman 2006: 83-84,
111). These stories are, naturally, de-temporalized and set in a vague past, but
the Amar alliance with the Muslim island Ujir is well documented from the
second half of the eighteenth century, when it was a factor in a violent uprising
against colonial rule.8 In Aru the Seramese were seen as a potentially powerful
anti-Dutch force, as can be seen from a rumour in 1663 to the effect that Banda
had been conquered by a coalition of Makassarese, Seramese, and English (Van
der Chijs 1891: 476). The English had kept a few islands in Banda until 1621,
and stories about their tenacious struggle had perhaps been disseminated by
the Bandanese refugees (compare Milton 1999). However, the major nuisance
from the Dutch point of view was the Makassarese. The Makassar empire
(Gowa and Tallo’) covered a huge stretch of lands and sea lanes from East
Kalimantan to Maluku, but there was also an informal realm that has so
far been poorly studied. The term Makassarese is frequently found in VOC
records from eastern Indonesia and could, in this context, denote all kinds
of seafaring people from South Sulawesi. One could assume that individual
skippers from Sulawesi organized expeditions that took advantage of the
political supremacy of the Gowa court, but ventured even farther. While their
basic aim was to establish contacts in order to acquire locally produced goods,
religion was also seen a means to cement such contacts. The ink on the VOC
contract with the Arunese villages had hardly dried before two Makassarese
vessels appeared in Aru around 1624 – an interesting concurrence that was
hardly coincidental. The newcomers persuaded a few orangkayas to convert to
Islam and constructed seven mosques in which the salat was performed on a
daily basis (Coolhaas 1960: 166-167). Understandably, the Company servants
were not amused. While the VOC pursued a live-and-let-live policy in religious
matters, and lorded over numerous Muslim subjects, it also fostered plans
to bind its allies and subjects through religious conversion (Knaap 2004: 99).
As so-called heathens, the Arunese were potential converts, but Islamization
would effectively block such efforts.
As it turned out, this first effort petered out, and it was only after 1650
that Islam took root on small but significant Ujir, the very place that had
first been approached by the Dutch. As a report of 1670 says, “Previously
the Makassarese conducted substantial shipping here, because the Moorish
creed was planted among them, as they had persuaded the Arunese and
sometimes brought them to Makassar for that purpose”.9 Even more worrying
for the Dutch was the loss of economic opportunities. Makassar was the
point of departure of an extensive trade in textiles that were taken to Borneo,
Mindanao, North Maluku, Ambon, Seram, Kei-Aru, Tanimbar, Solor, Timor,
Ende, Bima, Bali, Java et cetera, and that posed an obvious rival to Company
efforts to regulate this important commerce (Van der Chijs 1896: 124). In 1635
the Governor-General in Batavia made noises to the effect that the expansive
ambitions of Makassar must be stopped from gaining foothold in the Ambon
8
9

See the article by Hägerdal and Wellfelt in this issue.
VOC 1275, Report on Aru, Banda, 20-3-1670, f. 380.
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area, so as not to trouble Kei and Aru, acquire Buton or destroy the nutmeg
plantations in Banda. In the following year we hear of new Makassarese
initiatives. Via Seram’s north coast they sailed to Seram Laut-Gorom, ”Nay,
even to Kei and Aru, this is the most considerable secret reason we have tried
to guard against their expansion, hinder their progress and clip their wings”
(Coolhaas 1960: 494, 534). In 1639 ”those of Makassar declare that they have
brought some 100 kati or a picul ambergris from Kei and Aru this year. We
have purchased a small amount of that which is sent to Your Excellences [the
Seventeen Gentlemen in Amsterdam] with this [dispatch]” (Coolhaas 1964: 29).
Furthermore, a missive from December 1658 complains that twenty-five or
twenty-six ships had come to the eastern islands from Makassar in this year
alone. Some of them arrived in the anti-Dutch villages on Gorom and the rest
appear to have sailed to Aru, Kei and Tanimbar,”to which aforementioned
islands they are used to travel of old”. In eastern Indonesia the Dutch feared
that the Makassarese ”would try to expand their dominion over the islands
more and more, and bring those still heathen to the Mohammedan religion, to
which the Makassarese court seems very devoted in its own way” (Coolhaas
1968: 216). As we see from the quotations, the position of Aru was part of a
larger strategic scheme to keep the dangerous rivals from Sulawesi away.
Hence, no doubt this was a contributing factor to the Dutch establishment in
Wokam after 1659.
The defeat of Gowa at the hands of the VOC-led alliance in 1667, and again
in 1669, formally barred Makassarese seafarers from frequenting the waters of
Maluku without explicit permission. However, this was soon offset by grim
realities. Continuing warfare in South Sulawesi drove large numbers of BugisMakassar to seek their fortune overseas (Andaya 1995). While their activities
in Sumatra, Java and Sumbawa have been reasonably well documented, their
presence in eastern Indonesia is more shadowy. This once again underlines
the need to take a critical look at the extant sources, since it is quite clear that
these activities were not without their consequences economically for the local
societies; for example, much of the external trade with Portuguese Timor was
in their hands in the eighteenth century (Lombard-Jourdan 1982: 97-98). In
the case of Aru, there is sufficient evidence of intermittent visits, favoured
by the geography of the archipelago. The craggy islands and shallow waters
of the Backshore still make visits by larger vessels a hazardous undertaking,
but can be navigated by smaller crafts. This contrasts with the Dutch practice
of making for the safer western side and then navigating the natural canals
or sungai that divide the islands, or simply waiting there for the products to
be delivered by Arunese boats.

Christianity and Islam: the eastern end
Being situated at the eastern end of the Indian Ocean world, and in the vicinity
of the Melanesian Pacific world, Aru is a borderland in many respects. The
western villages on Ujir, Wokam, Wamar, and Maekor have been exposed to
cultural influences from and migrations by Austronesian groups, while the
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easterners of the Backshore, although still speakers of Austronesian languages,
have a stronger Papuan heritage, underlined by the different geographical
features. The VOC documents make a very clear distinction between the
western and eastern settlements: the former were susceptible to Christian
societal norms, while the latter were placed at the very bottom of human
civilization: “The most barbaric people in the world, devoid of any respect
or fear, fiercely trusting their impenetrable rocks and mountains, that are
inaccessible to Europeans” (De Klerk 1894: 30). But Aru is also a borderland
in the sense that it is about as far as Islam and Christianity reached in easterly
direction, before the first British settlement of Australia. A 1670 report provides
a rare glimpse of the protracted process of Islamization in Ujir and a few
adjacent settlements:
Ujir has two negeris. There is a freshwater river. One can enter there on a sloop until
one moors them by the poles of the houses. Of the two negeris, the lower one has
the most of the Moors. Apart from a few mu’ezzin, there is a priest or qadi there,
who is a Malay. However, the higher situated negeri is mostly heathen. Because
of this there is often dispute between the two negeris, since the higher-situated
one does not want to be Moorish. Nevertheless, as time passes there are some
who become Moors on account of dogged persistence […]. Ujir is well furnished
with provisions, more so than Wokam, because of the island Wasir that lies
opposite it and delivers a lot of rice. There is a negeri that is also mostly Moorish
and a dependency of the negeri Ujir. Fish is very abundant there, since they can
always place ceris [fish traps] there in the east and west monsoon. Behind Ujir is
the roadstead for large ships in the west monsoon. In the east monsoon the shore
is higher up all around, and therefore one can anchor anywhere.10

The advantageous situation and access to foodstuffs combined with the
networks with foreign Muslim traders to make Ujir a little commercial centre
in which Islam engendered a strong sense of identity that set it somewhat apart
from the rest of Aru. A word of warning, the notion of religious distinctions
should not be taken too far, since alliances easily crossed religious and ethnic
lines, and the Ujirese did not actually oppose the Dutch until much later, in
the 1780s.11 Nevertheless, the walls and buildings of stone in the old village of
Ujir, that can be partly glimpsed even to this day, testify to contacts with other
Muslim archipelagic civilizations in the early colonial era. These include what
was probably the easternmost mosque in the world in the early-modern era.12
Christianity spread to more villages, although the actual number of
baptized might not have exceeded the Muslims by much; at any rate, later data
from 1787 indicates 380 able-bodied men in Ujir and its dependent villages
Wasir, Samang, and Fangabel.13 The current situation, in which the majority
VOC 1275, Banda, Report on Aru, 20-3-1670, f. 380.
VOC 8034, Report, Banda, 30-7-1787.
12
Research into these ruins is currently being conducted by Joss Whittaker, University of
Washington; see also O’Connor, Spriggs, and Veth (2006). A photo of the still intact mosque
is found in Merton 1910: Tafel 8.
13
VOC 8034, Witness report by Nicolaas Harmansz, 1787.
10
11
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of the Arunese are Christians, is therefore the result of developments in the
late-colonial and post-colonial periods. When Pieter van Dam wrote his bulky
survey, Description of the East India Company, in 1701, after four decades of
proselytizing there were still not more than 257 Christians in the four negeris
Wokam, Wamar, Maekor, and Rumawa (Van Dam 1931: 210). The number
did not change much during the following century, although the orangkayas
and their families were usually quick to accept the new creed. In 1759 the
preacher Gerardus Verbeet counted 287 Christians in the islands (Verbeet
1762: 30). The pattern is similar to several other parts of eastern Indonesia
in which the Dutch or Portuguese held a hegemonic position and Islam had
not been widely disseminated: Wetar, Kisar, Leti, Larantuka, Timor. The tiny
number of Christian preachers and teachers could only minister to small
congregations that included a modest minority of the overall population
(Lampers n.y.). Apart from the possible attraction of the Christian message,
the religion might have been seen as a convenient platform for interaction
with the foreign suzerains, ensuring that it did not vanish over time.
The Dutch krankbezoeker (visitor of the sick; an almoner/lay-preacher)
worked in the islands in tandem with four Indonesian schoolmasters, his
stipend paid by the Banda authorities (Van Dam 1931: 210). One of his duties
was to make a detailed progress report to Banda, therefore we have fairly
abundant data about the mission. A dagregister from 1688 provides a picture
of the Wokam post that at first sight appears idyllic:
The church service and schooling are ably managed by the krankbezoeker and
schoolmaster, and continue in good order. On Sundays the open church service
is held, attended by old and young learners. In the morning around six o’clock,
after the beating of the gong, the pupils come to school, and again in the afternoon
at two o’clock, when a prayer is said before and after, and there is singing just
as is customary in Banda.14

However, the reports rumble with all sorts of complaints about the progress
of Christianization. “That the good work does not progress any better is
attributable only to the old Arunese Christians who can only be brought to
adherence to the word of God by numerous punishments and great effort,
since it is enough for them to have the name of Christian; and although they
are baptized they will still always […] resort to their heathen evil customs”.15
The Banda authorities tried to enforce Christianization by punishing tardiness
to pray with 50 units of sago, consented to by the orangkayas.16 Various local
customs, such as the loud shouting at burials and the keeping of concubines,
were assiduously maintained by the converted Arunese, and this enraged the
clerics. Particularly vile in the eyes of the Dutch was the belief in witchcraft.
Persons accused of being sorcerers lived in grave danger, as noted by a VOC
servant visiting the western negeris in 1686. The largely Christian orangkayas
14
15
16

VOC 8051, Dagregister Banda, sub 3-4-1688, f. 259.
VOC 8051, Dagregister Banda, sub 3-4-1688, f. 260.
VOC 1287, Dagregister Banda, sub 28-11-1671.
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readily asserted that, “There are many sorcerers among their nation [people],
hence they requested to be able to kill them, or else be allowed to send them
to the Company in Banda as slaves”. The Dutchman replied, “that they must
erase this and similar superstitions from their heads, and that this upset the
Noble Company”. However, the orangkayas persisted, and in the end the Dutch
took the supposed sorcerers on board to spare them from a worse fate.17 It is
of course impossible to say if there was more to the story in terms of Arunese
or Dutch motivations about taking these people to work on plantations.
Relations between Christians and Muslims oscillated between peaceful
co-existence and the threat of violence. The two religions were established
simultaneously in the 1650s, and their respective build-up phases already
engendered a few conflicts. The Dutch school in Wokam was matched by
a Muslim school under an imam in Ujir.18 In the 1670s there were repeated
complaints about the behaviour of Muslim leaders who tried to stop parents
(at least in the Muslim settlements) from sending their children to the Christian
school. The VOC authorities, for their part, attempted to force the Muslims
to halt propagating their religion, threatening them with expulsion by force
if they did not comply.19 The VOC records abound with Islamophobia; while
Islam was tolerated in places under VOC jurisdiction in which it had gained
steady ground and become established, Muslim conversion was frowned
upon in areas earmarked for Christianization (Niemeijer 2001). In the end,
however, a balance was struck under which the Ujirese-speaking villages of
Ujir, Wasir, Samang and Fangabel – the last two situated on Wokam – marked
the limits of Islam.

A colonial contact zone
Various places in coastal Asia in which the VOC had established itself were
characterized by a fragmented political situation, endemic low-scale warfare
and occasional raiding by outsiders. Examples of these are Minahasa and West
Timor. Even areas that had once been dominated by extensive kingdoms,
such as the Malay Peninsula and South Sulawesi, were often plagued by
local warfare. As pointed out by scholars such as David Henley (2002),
foreign suzerains, “stranger kings”, could therefore be effective under some
circumstances. In the best of worlds, they could act as mediators in local
conflicts and keep the system of minor polities or settlements in balance. Their
foreignness could even be an advantage since these suzerains were not tied
to particular clan interests. A colonial lord was therefore sometimes actively
endorsed by local communities in spite of the brutality and exploitation that
also accompanied the system. To some extent, the roots of colonialism can
be sought in African and Asian agency, and not merely in preconditions in
Europe.
17
18
19

VOC 8050, Dagregister Banda, sub 16-4-1686, f. 186.
VOC 1301, Report, May 1674.
VOC 1281, Report, 9-12-1670.
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Aru, and in particular its western negeris, present a good case of this.
Their readiness to accept a contract, the active invitation they extended to
Christian missionaries and their endorsement of the building of a VOC fort,
suggest that the west coast chiefs knew perfectly well what they were doing,
and that a limited Dutch presence was in their interest. This relationship
was accentuated by the routines that evolved after 1659. When a Company
servant appeared off Wokam on official business, usually once a year, he
would summon the various orangkayas of Ujir, Wokam, Wamar, and so on,
for a deliberation in order to settle any disputes that had arisen since the last
visit. These disputes could be of several kinds: between the various western
negeris, between people within a negeri, between these and the Backshore
people, between Arunese and Dutch people and between individual Dutch
residents. At the meetings arrack was handed out “to make some of these
known hypocrites somewhat more liberal”.20 An account from 1688 gives an
idea of the sometimes frustrating attempts to come to grips with the conflicts
arising in a relatively non-hierarchical and fragmented society:
On the island Aru, we have discerned some unrest and disturbances among the
inhabitants, and some complaints have reached us, of the majority hinging on
the following points. 1. Those of Wokam say that the inhabitants of Wamar have
taken away three of their people, and made them into slaves and 2. that they
have deprived them of an orembay [boat], and do not want to return it without
payment. 3. The orangkaya Tavoury made it known that a slave of his has escaped,
and arrived in the negeri Batuley, in which he has been kept by the inhabitants. 4.
The orangkaya of Fangabel complained that a certain person called Egbert had slept
with his sister, for which he requested two slaves and the same number of gongs.
After a detailed investigation of such matters, it seems to us and has been decided
by us, as follows. The first and second points, the accusations against those of
Wamar, have been rejected by us; we do not have the least proof of it. On the
third point, those of Batuley have replied to us that the slave is once again a
refugee and has since long gone into the forest; however, the parties have come
to an accord. On the fourth point, about the fornication with the orangkaya’s sister,
this has not been proven and hence is an allegation pure and simple without any
proof; therefore, we could not do anything about it.
About the customs and mores of the Arunese, we can only report that very few
offences among them, however gross they are, are punished by death, but only
by paying the offended party a monetary fine. This fine is often so high and
heavy that the delinquent and all his friends cannot pay, which unnatural custom
frequently evokes great dissension and hostilities among them.21

In spite of the low level of social stratification, slaves were omnipresent in
Arunese society, a consequence of internecine warfare. As valuable property,
they were often at the root of disputes, as seen above. The Arunese were
20
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not hard taskmasters and often let their slaves live in other negeris. If a slave
happened to be murdered, the owner asked the culprit for compensation.
If the latter refused to pay, the matter could easily escalate into fighting. A
quarrel of this sort erupted between the negeris Fangabel and Reriala in about
1670. When the latter did not pay for a slave of whom they had disposed, the
archers of Fangabel attacked. It might have ended in full-scale warfare if the
local Company employees had not intervened. As it was, they managed to
calm Fangbel down until orders arrived from Banda.22
Another common cause of turbulence was sexual transgression. A report
from 1671 relates that the negeri of Ujir had split into three parts because of
the loss of a perahu, and a case involving an unfaithful woman. The factions
prepared to attack one another but were once again reconciled by the
Company.23 In 1686, the orangkayas of Wamar, the Christian Barent Adamsz
and the Muslim Likketouw, picked a fight because Likketouw had seduced
Barent’s wife. However, the Dutch garrison acted quickly and collected all
the firearms in the negeri, and made the villagers promise to await a full
investigation, after which the Company would “punish the guilty person
after blame had been apportioned”.24 This also shows that muskets had been
disseminated in the western villages, meaning the Dutch had to walk on
eggshells in their efforts to mediate. During peace deliberations supervised
by the Dutch, the versions of the Arunese are sometimes quoted in detail,
allowing us a glimpse of the volatile political landscape of a stateless society.
When Captain Heysselbergh investigated local conflicts in 1684, he was
supplied with some intricate details that also inform us about local customs
of peace- and war-making:
We stressed that we had come to enquire about the issues and disputes between
[the Kobroor people] and the Wamarese, whose orangkaya was also present. The
Kobroorese, who were instructed to answer first, said that some time ago the
orangkayas of Kobroor, Mariri, Batuley and Wamar had gathered together in
negeri Batuley when all old and recent scores had been settled. The mother of
the orangkaya of negeri Wamar let the blood from the arms of everyone, and they
drank it together, mixed with sagueer, under pain that the first one who broke
the bond should be attacked by all in unison and ruined. Now, soon after the
confirmation of this bond, it happened that a ship from negeri Mariri went out
looking for food. A sabir from negeri Batuley hid behind a cape of a certain island
to which those from Mariri and other negeris went for fishing each day, intending
to attack the orembay [boat]. This is what happened. In this attack, an orangkaya
of Mariri fell. The Wamarese assisted the Batuleyese, who were the first bondbreakers, by supplying four men. They said that this was the only reason they
had destroyed the negeri and killed some of its people.25
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If they were to strike a balance in the islands, the Dutch needed trustworthy
interlocutors who stood in high enough regard in local society to implement
Company policies. All over maritime Asia, local kings and sultans co-operated
with European stranger lords in a system of dependencies anchored by
contracts and agreements. In eastern Indonesia, even minor rajas upheld such
accords (Hägerdal 2012). However, there were no rajas in Aru, only headmen
or guli, in the VOC documents translated by the Malay term orangkaya. In
the nineteenth century, the scholar and civil servant Riedel wrote the first
comprehensive ethnography of southern Maluku and provided a picture
that is strikingly reminiscent of the 1623 expedition referred earlier. The
orangkayas were chosen by the villagers and their status was confirmed by the
Dutch authorities if possible (although many headmen did not bother about
this). However, the latter realized that they could only conduct their affairs in
deliberation with the descendants of the village founders, the elders, the rich
and the heads of the households. There were also groups of forest people, the
Gorngai and Tungu, on the islands of Kola and Kobroor, who had no leaders
at all and did not construct houses (Riedel 1886: 258, 270). Despite the apparent
timelessness of this pattern, the Aru Islands were far from unchanging. Riedel
refers to a tradition by which contacts with foreigners from Ternate, Tidore,
Seram, and Gorom had led to the introduction of Malay and European titles
such as raja, orangkaya, kapitan and mayor (Riedel 1886: 251). While this claim
is poorly documented, individual orangkayas had certainly had ceremonial
staffs with knobs bearing the VOC cap (emblem) bestowed on them since the
seventeenth century. They were also given status symbols, such as pistols,
coats and hats, by the Dutch.26 By the solemn bestowal of authority and the
objects that symbolized it, the headmen were upgraded to an increasingly
institutionalized position. Consequently the position of orangkaya tended to be
inherited by certain families, such as the Harmensz in Wokam, the Barentsz in
Durjela (Wamar), and the Tamalola and Bolbol lineages in Ujir – in the last case
perhaps also attributable to the influence exerted by other Muslim Indonesian
groups. The Dutch surnames demonstrate the willingness of the lineages to
adapt to elements of Dutch culture in order to profile themselves within the
internal order.27 Some of these lineages have retained their importance up to
the present day.28 The persistence of such dynastic dynamics over hundreds of
years suggests that the alliance between the foreigners and locally created elites
worked. It was only in the 1780s that the by then corrupt VOC encountered
serious resistance from some western villages, and then as a result of influences
from Tidore and Gorom.29
VOC 1401, Orders and instructions to Jan Jacobsz Heysselbergh, 1684, f. 740. For Tidore’s
role in the archipelago, see Widjojo 2009.
27
This can be compared to the ruling lineages of the local East Timorese kingdoms that
adopted Portuguese dynastic names in and after the seventeenth century (Belu 2011).
28
For example, the orangkaya Barent of Wamar, mentioned in the late seventeenth-century
sources, seems to have been the ancestor of the Barentsz lineage who were acknowledged as
rajas with authority over the Ursia bond in the late colonial era. The last representative, Bastian
Barentsz, was reportedly murdered in 1983 (interview, Johan Kobrua, Durjela, 11-4- 2016).
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See the article by Hägerdal and Wellfelt, in this issue.
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At war with the villages
In spite of the successful bonding of the western negeris, the early phase of VOC
suzerainty was subjected to a few periods of turbulence and violence. Much
of this had to do with the uneasy relations between the western villagers and
the so-called Alfurs, the allegedly primitive peoples of the interior and east
coast.30 The islanders of Batuley, Mariri, Barakai et cetera were protected by
the shallow and dangerous sea to the east, and often lived in villages situated
on rocky bluffs that could only be reached by means of ladders. The Batuley
people especially were frequently at odds with the westerners and mounted
raids in their sabir (boats) via the sungai (canals) that divide the major islands.
This violence, however, alternated with periods of economic exchange. Aru
in the seventeenth century was economically interesting for both “luxury”
(non-essential) products and items in daily use. The former included turtleshell, parrots, birds-of-paradise and subsequently pearls; while the latter
included sago, livestock, timber and slaves. The majority of the products for
luxury consumption were found in the interior or Backshore, where they were
gathered by the Alfurs and traded to the west via the sungais. The goods were
then bartered by the VOC employees and licensed traders from Banda for
Indian textiles, gongs, elephant tusks, iron tools, ceramics, and the like. The
well-known encyclopaedic writer François Valentijn outlines Aru’s economic
place in the VOC domain by the early eighteenth century:
These people come to Amboina now and then, which was ratified by Their
Excellencies [the Supreme Government] on 26 January 1670. However, in the
following year it was ordered that they be kept out of Amboina and Java.
There are no rivers there, so that one must be content with very bad water from
wells or still water, which is probably the reason why many [visitors] die, and
that those who come back from there look very unhealthy.
On the islands of Aru, Kei, etc. only the [VOC] Bandanese, to whom they are
actually subordinate, may go there, and no Ambonese without the permission of
Their Excellencies. This was expressly ordered on 6 March 1691, when Jacob van
Cordan who was then staying on Amboina was excused. Also, Their Excellences
forbade the Ambonese, by order issued on 14 March 1681, to buy slaves from the
Southeast Islands there, but [buy them] only on Banda.
Also, on 22 February 1704 they ordered those of Banda, that they should be careful
who they sent to the Southeast Islands in order if possible to prevent that any
calamity befall the islanders.
Just as the Bandanese now go to these islands, and send people thither annually
on behalf of the Noble Company, the Southeast Islanders annually arrive in their
ships, and stay on Banda in September or at the end of the easterly monsoon to
trade.
The term Alfurs is not ethnic as such, but was used for various non-Christian and nonMuslim groups in parts of Maluku who were considered to be uncivilized people (woeste
volckeren).
30
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In the main these goods consist of slaves [and] sago that Banda does not have
but must obtain for its slaves, toetombos (beatiful boxes of leaves and sea shells,
fitting into each other), birds-of-paradise, king’s birds, kacang (a kind of pulse),
wood to build ships etc., pinang, dried fish, ripe kelapa, large batatas and other
edible comestibles, and also somewhat rice and paddy which however is of little
importance, plus other small items for the fort (Valentijn 1726: 43).31

Generally speaking, Aru was more important to the Banda post as a trading
partner than the other islands in southern Maluku, since Banda needed
supplies of slaves and foodstuffs on a regular basis. Complete lists of slaves
on the Banda plantations for the late seventeenth century have been found,
showing that a very considerable part of the unfree labour originated from
Aru, mostly probably taken in warfare and raiding among the Alfurs.32 The
slaves were fed on Arunese sago. Bird-of-paradise plumage, turtle-shells and
pearls had a global market, although their limited quantities reduced them
to a secondary role in the VOC economy. To ensure the continuation of this
economic flow, a degree of stability was necessary, not only in the western
negeris but also on an Aru-wide level.
The equilibrium was threatened fairly soon after the arrival of the Dutch.
It appears that the presence of foreigners accentuated economic imbalances
and this built up tension between the VOC-allied western villages and the
Backshore. In 1661 the Alfurs, headed by negeri Balatan, on the east side of
Kobroor Island, successfully raided the staunchly pro-VOC Maekor and ruined
the pearl-fishing village Woor, “saying that they did not ask for the Dutch, or
any others” (Van der Chijs 1889: 302). The people of Wokam tried to worst
Balatan, but to no avail. They then took the logical step of calling in the VOC.
Captain Gabriel Nakken, who visited Wokam at the time, agreed to contribute
some eight to ten armed Dutchmen. The number seems ridiculously small,
but apparently made a difference in this world of low-scale warfare, in which
firearms were still a rarity. The official account points to the peculiarities of
warfare in the Backshore:
A power consisting of 5-600 men with forty-four korakoras was summoned
from the surrounding negeris. With these he arrived on the eastern side of the
land of Aru on 11 June. Close to land lay the foremost negeri, called Balatan.
It is a very lofty, steep, impenetrable rock in the sea, rough all around. One
climbs up and down on a long ladder, that is pulled up when the enemy
approaches, so that it is impossible to climb [up to it]. The inhabitants of this
negeri are the princes among robbers, and are those who are most responsible
for the ruin of the aforementioned negeri Woor. When they saw that our people
were approaching, they acted very defiantly, spoke many villainous words,
danced and beat the tijf [drum], but did not mount an attack. Our people
A description of commerce in Dobo on Wamar Island can be found in the work of the wellknown naturalist Alfred Russell Wallace (1869: 361-6; compare Spyer 2000: 10-2). Nevertheless,
Dobo only evolved as a centre in the nineteenth century. Trade normally seems to have been
conducted near the Dutch post in Wokam.
32
For such slave list, see VOC 1622, List dated 19-9-1699, f. 82-119.
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landed the next day when it was ebb-tide and fiercely attacked the rock, so
that a good part of the enemy were killed, but none of our men. However,
since there was no chance to scale the rock, they made a ladder in order to
take it by storm. The former second mate Cornelis Jansz van Flensburg was
the first who to ascend the ladder but received a small wound on his forehead.
Gabriel Nakken summoned him back since he did not want to waste any men.
Opposite this rock, on the island lies another rock which has a flat top. These
two rocks are of the same height and the last-mentioned is suitable for placing
a piece of artillery in order to fire upon the negeri on the rock. Our people had
taken note of this. The people of the negeri saw what we were about and fled
the island during night when the tide was high. Our people were not aware of
this before they had broken through, and bravely pursued them in the night.
After a hard fight they took four women, five children and four men, mortally
wounded, whom they beheaded as revenge. They then entered the negeri,
annihilated it and set it on fire. Thirteen dead were found in there. (Van der
Chijs 1889: 302-303).

The expedition was followed by a new round of inconclusive fighting in
1663. However, new tensions were built up in the following two decades,
culminating in a bloody incident in 1680. At first sight the event seemed to
confirm European ideas about the Alfurs as bloodthirsty thugs. A merchant
vessel sailing up the sungai Serwatu in the interior was approached by locals
from Barakai and Mariri who invited the Dutch to a meal. Against the advice
of the others, two merchants accepted and went ashore with the Alfurs. Shortly
afterwards, the crew heard shots and presumed the two Dutchman had been
murdered, returning in haste after beating off an attack by Alfurs in canoes
(De Haan 1912: 359). Later, new information revealed a less one-sided affair.
After a first, friendly meeting, the Dutch had fired a salute that frightened the
locals; a canoe had capsized in the water and a child was drowned (Coolhaas
1971: 605-606). Although this was an unhappy accident, the Dutch used this
and some other incidents as an excuse to send a substantial expedition to Aru
in order to settle the score with the Backshore villages once and for all. Captain
Jan Heysselbergh arrived there with sixty-nine men in April 1684. Joining
forces with a fleet of sabir from the western negeris, the following month the
Company undertook three forays to the eastern and northern regions, that are
described in gruesome detail in a lengthy dagregister. The only actual battle
was fought in waist-deep water and mud off Barakai Island, whose inhabitants
tried in vain to fight off the intruders with arrows, spears and cutlasses. The
raids tended to follow a monotonous pattern. The VOC and its allies would
approach a village whose inhabitants escaped in good time and hence could
not be caught. The fear of the locals was interpreted as resistance, the empty
village was burnt and the fleet proceeded to launch an assault on its next
target. In Kobroor the Dutch actually managed to arrange a conference with
the local headmen and a settlement seemed to be within reach. Then the Dutch
asked for a gift for the Noble Company in order to cement the truce. The
Kobroor headmen offered a slave and two gongs. This was politely refused
by Heysselbergh who suggested twenty-four slaves would be a proper gift.
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The Kobroorese replied that there were not that many slaves in their territory.
Although Heysselbergh decreased the demand to eighteen slaves to be paid in
three instalments, the frightened population soon evaporated into the forest,
whereupon the Dutch reduced Kobroor to ashes.33
The raids were not really decisive since the perceived enemies generally
remained invisible. It was a type of conflict that did not tally with European
ideas of warfare. As did many tribal societies around the world, the small,
low-technology populations pursued a strategy of avoidance to minimize
losses, and might not have understood why the Dutch were confronting
them.34 Later Heysselbergh’s behaviour was sharply criticized by the Supreme
Government in Batavia that questioned his burning of Kobroor, a deed that
was not according to the instructions (Coolhaas 1971: 712). This was the last
Dutch military expedition to Aru of any consequence for more than a century.
The ravaging of the Backshore probably strengthened the preponderance of
the VOC-allied western negeris in the economic redistribution system. The rise
in the demand for two luxury items stabilized this system in the eighteenth
century. The increasing Chinese demand for trepang in the mid-Qing era
encouraged the regular harvesting and preparation of these sea creatures.35
Meanwhile, Barakai, that had been ruined in the warfare of 1684, became a
centre of pearl-fishing, that yielded limited but not inconsequential profits
(Valentijn 1726: 41-42).

Conclusions
Seventeenth-century Aru provides an interesting study of economic
redistribution, precisely because its marginal geographical position in the
system of Asian commercial routes and early European colonialism. Situated
at the end of the world frequented by Europeans in the early-modern period,
the islands offered the VOC a challenge, forcing it to apply the methods used
in supposedly “civilized” parts of maritime Asia to its interaction with lowtechnology groups without a trace of statehood. To an extent it was building
on a pre-colonial Banda-Aru redistribution system. The signing of contracts,
the implementation of monopoly regulations and the establishment of a
Christian mission plus the construction of a fort, were common devices used
to tie local Asian populations to the colonial apparatus, fomenting a partial
hybridity. However, the cultural and geographical features of Aru nudged
interaction in a peculiar direction, one in which deference to the “Noble
Company” was entwined with strategies of avoidance, somewhat reminiscent
of the state-avoiding strategies of the mainland Southeast Asian hill peoples
VOC 1401, Dagregister, Heysselberg expedition, 1684, f. 871-913.
For the strategy of avoiding pitched battles, common in small-scale societies, see Keegan
1993.
35
For the methods of preparing trepang in the early nineteenth century, see Bik (1928: 69-72).
Hundreds of Barakai women and children would walk across the reefs with baskets on their
backs, catching trepang with iron-tipped sticks, while specially equipped ships went to less
accessible waters. The trepang had to be boiled, dried and again boiled with sugar cane before
being suitable for consumption.
33
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studied by Scott (2009). The VOC system overlay a traditional ritual division,
the Siwa-Lima bonds entrenched throughout much of Maluku, and a certain
contradiction between the more Austronesian-imprinted western negeris and
the more Papuan-descended Backshore settlements. To this must be added the
ambivalent relationship between the global forces of Islam and Christianity
that even here, at the very margin of their respective spheres, displayed a
characteristic oscillation between co-existence and occasional hostility. The
friction and fissures resulting from all these layers stirred up a great deal of
turbulence and required Dutch armed intervention before the system was
stabilized after 1684. Even after that point in time, the tiny Dutch presence
was unable to prevent Aru’s inclusion in alternative archipelagic systems,
especially the commercial networks of the Bugis-Makassar and Seramese
peoples. Nevertheless, the Dutch were functional in the eyes of many Arunese,
as mediating “stranger kings” who kept the fragmented communities in
place. While this function must not be allowed to detract from the brutal
and exploitative aspects of early colonialism (cum-merchant-capitalism),
it emphasizes the need to analyse the constitutive roles of colonizer and
colonized and highlight the viewpoint of the latter, even if it has to be traced
via European texts.
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